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THE CONVENTIONAL OPTION
GREGORY KOGER
SERGIO J. CAMPOS*
ABSTRACT

The filibuster in the United States Senate effectively imposes a
supermajority vote requirement to pass any legislation. Both supporters
and critics of the filibuster agree that any filibuster reform would require
extraordinary measures. In contrast to this consensus, this Article
describes a method we call the "conventional option," which allows the
filibuster to be reformed by a simple majority of senators at any time using
ordinary Senate procedures. As we show below, a majority of senators
using the conventional option (1) cannot be filibustered; (2) can act on
any day the Senate is in session (not just at the beginning of a new
Congress); and (3) does not need to invoke the Constitution. In fact, this
Article shows that both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate
have limited filibustering in the past by using the conventional option
described here.
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INTRODUCTION

Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) was fed up. Reid, the majority leader for
the Democrats in the United States Senate,' had hoped that the Senate
would confirm three nominees to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.2
However, the Republican minority was filibustering their confirmation. 3
Republican obstruction against these nominations was part of a broader
strategy of forcing an unprecedented number of votes on whether the
Senate should end filibusters using the Senate's "cloture" rule.4 Since a
three-fifths majority is necessary to invoke cloture, this increased use of
the filibuster effectively imposes a supermajority vote requirement to
approve nominations or pass most legislation in the Senate. In the past,

1. For the sake of brevity, we refer to the United States Senate as the "Senate" and the United
States House of Representative as the "House of Representatives" or the "House."
2. Press Release, U.S. Senate Democrats, Reid Remarks on Republican Obstruction of Judicial
Nominees (Nov. 18, 2013, 3:51 PM), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/2013/11/18/reidremarks-on-republican-obstruction-of-judicial-nominees/.
3. Id.
4. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger Nuclear' Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-tolimit- filibusters -in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/dO65cfe8-52b61 le3-9feO-fd2ca728e67c story.html (providing chart of increases in the use of filibuster to obstruct).
5.

GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE

AND SENATE 1 14 (2010) [hereinafter FILIBUSTERING]. On the Senate cloture rule, see infra note 48
and accompanying text. Proposals to change the rules of the Senate are subject to a cloture threshold of
two-thirds of all senators voting.
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Reid vowed to "change the rules and make the filibuster meaningful., 6 But
Reid had refrained from implementing any reform apart from limited
changes at the beginning of the 112th and 113th congressional terms.
On Thursday, November 21, 2013, however, Reid made good on his
threat to change the rules by setting in motion what has become
colloquially known as "the nuclear option."8 By a vote of fifty-two to
forty-eight, senators enacted a new precedent allowing a simple majority
of the Senate to limit debate for all nominations except those to the U.S.
Supreme Court. 9 The term "nuclear option" dates at least as far back as
2005, when, ironically, then Senate Republican majority leader Bill Frist
(R-TN) threatened to use "the nuclear option" to prevent the filibustering
of President Bush's judicial nominees.' ° The "nuclear option" then, as
now, was based on a proposal made in a law review article written by
Martin Gold and Dimple Gupta that argued that a simple majority in the
Senate has a limited "constitutional option" to change the existing
filibuster rules."
Terms like "nuclear" and "constitutional" reflect a consensus that any
reform of the filibuster would require extraordinary and unprecedented
measures. This consensus supports a conclusion shared by many that it
would be "rude"' 12 for a majority of Senators to reform the filibuster
because it would "change[] . . . the rules in the midst of a game."' 3 Thus,
Gold and Gupta emphasized that a majority of senators use the
"constitutional option" at the beginning of a congressional term, when,
arguably, a new Senate can jettison the old rules and impose new ones to

6. Suzy Khimm, Harry Reid Promises Filibuster Reform if Dems Win the Election, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (July 17, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/

2012/07/17/harry-reid-promises-filibuster-reform-if-dems-win-the-election/; see also Sam Stein &
Ryan Grim, Harry Reid: Filibuster Reform Will Be Pursued in the Next Congress, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 7, 2012, 1:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/harry-reid-filibuster-reform

n 2088767.html.
7.

For a discussion of the 2011 and 2013 reforms, see infra Part I.B.4.

8. Kane, supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senators Who Averted Showdown Face New Test in Court Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/14/politics/14gang.html?pagewanted=all.
11. Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and

Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Over Come the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205
(2004).
12. See Ezra Klein, The Date for Filibuster Reform: Jan. 22. Probably., WASH. POST
WONKBLOG (Jan. 3, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/

03/the-date- for-filibuster-reform-january-22-probably/?wprss =rss ezra-klein.
13. See Letter from Bruce A. Ackerman et al., to Members of the United States Senate (Dec. 12,
2012), available at http://www.tomudall.senate.gov/files/documents/ScholarsLettertoSenate.pdf.
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govern the term. 14 Others have tried to support changes to the filibuster by
appealing to the Constitution's "implicit directive of simple majority
rule."' 5 Indeed, prior to Sen. Reid's use of the nuclear option, a lawsuit
filed by the left-leaning public interest group Common Cause alleged that
the modern Senate filibuster is unconstitutional because it is "inconsistent
with the principle
of majority rule" implied by various provisions of the
6
Constitution.'
In this Article, we argue against the consensus that filibuster reform by
a majority of senators is (1) extraordinary, (2) unprecedented, and
therefore (3) requires an appeal to Constitutional authority. Indeed, we
take issue with the term "nuclear option" insofar as it has been defined as
any option that allows a majority of senators to reform the filibuster
without the consent of the minority. Instead, we show that filibuster
reform by a majority of senators (1) only requires quite ordinary measures,
(2) has been done extensively in the past, and, accordingly, (3) should not
be viewed as improper or indecorous. Indeed, as we show below, the
"nuclear option" as used by Sen. Reid can be understood as a
"conventional option," one that has been used throughout the history of
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
In Part I, we explain the ordinary procedures a majority of senators can
use to reform the filibuster at any time. These procedures, which we call
the conventional option, utilize the rules and procedures that govern rule
interpretation in the Senate. As we show below, the conventional option is
conventional in the sense that it only relies upon the ordinary rules and
precedents of the Senate.17 It does not require the cooperation of a
supermajority of Senators. It does not require Senators to wait for the
beginning of a new Congress. It does not require an appeal to the
Constitution.

14. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217 60 (discussing this option first and at length, as
opposed to the conventional option discussed here).
15.

See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITThN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND

PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 362 63 (2012); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Gary Hart, How to End the
Filibuster Forever, SLATE (Jan. 6, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politicsj
urisprudence/201 1/01/how to end the filibuster forever.html.
16. Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment at 3, Common Cause v. Biden, No. 1:12-cv-00775,
2014 WE 1420327 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2014); see also Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the
Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1035 37 (2011) (making similar arguments concerning the
unconstitutionality of the Senate filibuster, but noting that judicial review of the issue "would be a
non-starter").
17. Conventional, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/conventional (last visited Sept. 11, 2013) (defining "conventional" as, among other things,
"common and ordinary: not unusual").
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We further show that the conventional option is quite versatile and can
be used to enact a number of reforms. We provide five such potential
reforms that a majority of senators could enact through the conventional
option.'8 Indeed, we show that the process used by Sen. Reid to abolish the
filibuster for judicial nominees is far from optimal and that better
alternatives are available.' 9
In Part II, we further demonstrate that the conventional option is
"conventional" in another important sense. The rhetoric surrounding the
"nuclear option" suggests that any reform of the filibuster by a Senate
majority would be unprecedented, or at least a significant departure from
the historic practices and procedures of the Senate. But, as we discuss in
Part II, the procedures that comprise the conventional option have been
used throughout the history of the House and Senate to limit filibustering.
Indeed, it has been the most common, conventional method of reforming
the filibuster. 20 As we discuss below, the House of Representatives, in
fact, abolished the filibuster using the conventional option we discuss in
this Article. 2
Our goal in writing this Article is not to criticize or defend the
filibuster. Instead, our goal is to show that the recent actions of the
Democratic majority to abolish the filibuster for judicial nominees should
not be seen as unprecedented, extraordinary, or unseemly. That view is not
only incorrect, but it presumes that the filibuster itself is a normal
procedure that senators are, for the most part, powerless to change.
However, as we show below, the filibuster is not, nor has to be, an
inviolable part of the Senate. More importantly, the existence of the
conventional option demonstrates that the key obstacle to filibuster reform
is not the Senate rules, but the reluctance of a majority of senators to enact
it. Accordingly, we hope that by showing how simple it is for a majority to
change the filibuster at any time, public debate will focus squarely on
whether filibustering as currently practiced in the Senate advances or
harms the public interest. Paradoxically, senators may be more likely to
arrive at bipartisan compromises on Senate process once they fully
acknowledge the extent of the Senate majority to reshape the rules of the
Senate without minority party consent.

18. See infra Part LB.
19. See infra Parts LB.4 & LC.
20. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra note 17 (defining "conventional" as "used
and accepted by most people: usual or traditional").
21. See infra Part IHA.
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This Part provides a guide for reforming the modern filibuster in the
Senate, which we call the conventional option. Our guide shows how the
conventional option allows a simple majority of senators to reform the
filibuster any day the Senate is in session without having to appeal to
constitutional authority. As shown below, the conventional option we
describe utilizes commonly used procedures of rule interpretation in the
Senate.
A The Rules of the Senate Filibuster
1. Filibustering in the Senate
For the sake of clarity, we define filibustering in a legislature as the
threat or use of delay to obstruct an event for strategic gain.22 Understood
in this broad sense, a legislator can filibuster by making dilatory motions,
by proposing meaningless amendments, by refusing to vote en masse, or
by making long speeches. 23 As defined, filibustering is not unique to the
Senate. It has occurred in dozens of state and international legislatures. In
fact, and as we discuss later in this Article, filibustering was once
pervasive in the House of Representatives. 24
The traditional response to filibustering is a war of attrition. In these
contests, the majority forces the obstructionists to remain on the floor of
the chamber and actively consume time. The winner is the side that lasts
the longest, but both sides lose time and sleep in the process.
A second response is cloture, where the majority attempts to limit the
duration of floor debate using a motion provided for in the rules of the
legislature. Under Rule XXII of the Senate rules, a senator can move for
cloture, but any such motion requires sixty votes to end debate,25 with
some exceptions. 26 In the modern Senate, almost all filibusters consist of

22.
23.

FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 3 (citing AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000)).
Id. at 3-4 (discussing examples).

24. See infra Part IH.A.
25. SENATE RULE XXII,

SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS,

AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at

21 (2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome.
"Closure" is also sometimes used to refer to the general idea of a rule to limit debate. See id. (.'
Is it the
sense of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?' And if that question shall be decided in
the affirmative by three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn .... ").
26. There are specific classes of legislation most notably budget resolutions and budget

reconciliation bills

that cannot be filibustered because there are statutory limits on how long they can

be debated on the Senate floor. See id. at 21 22.
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threats to filibuster. Senators rarely occupy the floor of the Senate for an
active filibuster, and instead place the burden on the majority to
successfully move for cloture.2
A third response is to revise the rules and practice of the legislature.
Simply put, filibustering is usually the weapon of a minority in legislatures
with endogenous rules. Accordingly, a frustrated majority may reduce or
eliminate the ability of a minority to obstruct.
However, frustrated majorities in the Senate face a Catch-22. If the
Senate rules and practice allow obstruction through the filibuster, then any
proposal to restrict filibustering may itself be filibustered. The Senate's
cloture rule imposes a higher threshold in such cases: a motion for cloture
to end debate on a formal amendment to the Senate rules requires a twothirds majority, which is greater than the threshold to end an ordinary
filibuster against a bill or nomination and seemingly prevents a narrow
majority from limiting the Senate filibuster.28
2. The Senate Rules
To unravel this Gordian knot, a more detailed discussion of the Senate
rules that allow for filibustering is required. The Constitution provides that
"[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings., 29 But no
provision of the Constitution, or parliamentary rule in the Senate or the
House, guarantees an explicit right to filibuster.
The Constitution does, however, contain a provision for a roll call vote
upon the request of one-fifth of those present,30 which allows for
obstruction by dilatory motions. The Constitution also includes a simple
majority quorum requirement for both houses,"' which allows for
obstruction by quorum-breaking. The Framers were well aware that these
provisions would provide a basis for obstruction. For example, James
Mason, one of the original framers, expressed support for quorumbreaking in the Virginia legislature to thwart a "paper money" bill.32

27. See FILIIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 179 83.
28. See id. at 20 21; SENATE RULE XXII, SENATE MANUAL, at 21 (The three-fifths vote
requirement applies "except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules, in which case the
necessary affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and voting").
29. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
30. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas
and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those
Present, be entered on the Journal.").

31.

Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 ("[A] Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business").

32.

Madison Debates, Tuesday, August 10, 1787, THE AVALON PROJECT: DOCUMENTS N LAW,
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That is not to say that the Framers unequivocally endorsed filibustering
or minority vetoes. Indeed, in The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton
condemned minority obstruction and supermajority thresholds, particularly
those contained in the Articles of Confederation.33 Instead, we only
suggest that the Framers were familiar with the practice of obstruction and
held mixed views on the practice. In this sense, they were much like
contemporary critics and defenders of the Senate filibuster, except their
arguments were presumably free from appeals to the true intent of the
Founding Fathers.
In accordance with Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, the Senate
has adopted forty-three formal rules to govern its proceedings, including
Rule XXII, which is mentioned above.3 4 It has long been common practice
to treat these rules as continuing in force from one Congress to the next
without formal re-adoption.35 This practice is now codified in Senate Rule
V, which provides that "[t]he rules of the Senate shall continue from one
Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in
these rules. '
Of course, Rule V is only binding if the Senate is a
"continuous body,",3 7 which is itself a parliamentary question that senators
can revisit at the beginning of each new Congress.38
In their article, Gold and Gupta argue in favor of a "constitutional
option" to reform the filibuster, which would overturn this tradition and,
instead, require the Senate to begin each new Congress in a state of

HISTORY & DIPLOMACY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/debates 810.asp (last visited Dec.
17, 2012).
33. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that supermajority requirements
like the ones found in the Articles of Confederation "substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an
insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt [faction for] the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable
majority"); id. No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting "that all provisions which require more than the
majority of any body to its resolutions, have a direct tendency to embarrass the operations of the
government, and an indirect one to subject the sense of the majority to that of the minority").
34. See SENATE RULE XXII, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS,
LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No.

112-1, at 21 (2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenate
Home.
35. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 240-47 (noting this understanding prior to passage of Senate
Rule V in 1963).
36. See SENATE RULE V, SENATE MANUAL, at 5.
37. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 464
(2004) (noting that "the Senate has always viewed itself as a continuing body and has never
reconstructed itself, like the House of Representatives, from scratch at the outset of every session").
Support for the "continuing body" theory of the Senate can also be found in McGrain v. Daugherty,
where the Court held that subpoenas issued by a Senate committee were not moot after the end of a
Congress because the Senate is "a continuing body." 273 U.S. 135, 181 (1927). We note that our
argument does not depend on whether the Senate is a continuing body one way or the other.
38. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 207 10.
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parliamentary anarchy until new rules are formally adopted.3 9 We discuss
the constitutional option in greater detail in the next section. 40 However,
we note that a second way to reform the filibuster, one acknowledged but
deemphasized by Gold and Gupta, is to raise and win a parliamentary
point of order reinterpreting an existing Senate rule or clarifying an
ambiguity in the rules. 41 We argue that this conventional option-and not
an appeal to constitutional authority-is the secret to filibuster reform by a
simple majority. And, critically, the conventional option, unlike the
constitutional option, can be utilized at any time during a two-year
Congressional term.
3. Senate Rule Interpretation
Like statutes or the Constitution, the rules of the Senate are subject to
interpretation. But unlike these other legal sources, the Senate rules are
enforced and interpreted by the senators themselves rather than a court.
During Senate deliberation, any senator can submit a point of order to the
Presiding Officer of the Senate challenging the enforcement or
interpretation of a rule.42 Although the Constitution defines the Presiding
Officer as the Vice-President,43 in practice the Senate elects a President
pro tempore to serve as the Presiding Officer in the Vice-President's
absence. 44 The President pro tempore, in turn, often delegates the task of
presiding over the chamber to other members of the majority party.
Once a point of order is submitted, the Presiding Officer either sustains
or denies it, unless it raises a constitutional question.45 A senator has the

39. Id. at 217.
40. See infra Part I.B.1.
41. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 260 61.
42.

SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS,

AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at

21 (2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome
(providing that "[a] question of order may be raised at any stage of the proceedings").
43. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 4 ("The Vice President of the United States shall be President of
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.").
44. Id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 5 ("The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro
tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the
United States.").
45. SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL, at 19 20 ("A question of order.... unless submitted
to the Senate, shall be decided by the Presiding Officer without debate, subject to an appeal to the
Senate."). Although the text of RULE XX does not create an exception for constitutional issues,
previous Presiding Officers have treated points of order concerning constitutional issues this way. See
Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 249 (noting that in 1963 then Vice President Johnson referred a point
of order to the full Senate because "the motion raised an issue of constitutional interpretation"); see

[VOL. 91:867

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46

right to appeal any decision by the Presiding Officer. Appeals are
decided by a simple majority vote of those senators present. 4
However, appeals are typically debatable, 4 and it is unclear if such
debate can be limited. One option is for a senator to make a non-debatable
motion to table an appeal. Any decision upheld or overturned by a direct
vote or a tabling motion is considered precedent having the same force
and effect as a formal rule.49 Second, a Presiding Officer might, of his or
her own accord, intervene in debate on an appeal and declare that
sufficient discussion has occurred. A third tactic would be to raise a
second point of order that debate is not permitted on an appeal from the
ruling of the Presiding Officer. This secondary point of order is guaranteed
an immediate vote by Senate Rule XX:
When an appeal is taken, any subsequent question of order which
may arise before the decision of such appeal shall be decided by the
Presiding Officer without debate; and every appeal therefrom shall
be decided at once, and without debate.50
By invoking this rule, a majority can use a second point of order to
circumvent a filibuster on the primary point of order.
B. How to Use the Conventional Option
The general ability of senators to interpret the rules of the Senate at any
time has not gained much attention in the legal debate over filibuster
reform. In this Section, we show how much discretion senators enjoy over
the meaning of their rules and the right to filibuster by sketching out five
strategies to reform the filibuster using the procedures for Senate rule
interpretation. We refer to this specific method for reforming the filibuster
through Senate rule interpretation as the "conventional option," because
this method utilizes the conventional, ordinary rules of the Senate, and
nothing else.

also SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL, at 20 ("The Presiding Officer may submit any question of
order for the decision of the Senate.").
46. Id. at 19 (providing that any question of order is "subject to an appeal to the Senate").
47.

FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMiN, RIDDICK'S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND

PRACTICES, S. Doc. 101-28, at 145-49 (Alan S. Frumin, ed., rev. ed. 1992).
48. Id.; see also Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 260 (noting that "debate may generally be had
on appeals.").
49. SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL, at 20 ("[A]ny appeal may be laid on the table without
prejudice to the pending proposition, and thereupon shall be held as affirming the decision of the
Presiding Officer.").
50. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
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Because all five strategies we outline utilize the conventional option,
we begin with Figure 1, which provides a stylized example of how the
conventional option would be used to reform the filibuster. For the sake of
clarity, Figure 1 assumes two teams, Pro and Con, who respectively
support and oppose reform, and who make the next parliamentary move at
each stage instead of surrendering. Figure 1 also omits any other
extraneous motions that may arise.
FIGURE 1

SEQUENCE OF MOVES IN RuLING ON POINTS OF ORDER
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It is worth highlighting that a strategy which uses the conventional
option illustrated by Figure 1 only requires a majority of senators present
who favor the strategy to ensure its passage. Indeed, because, under the
Constitution, the Senate only requires "a majority" of senators to establish
a quorum, filibuster reform through the conventional option could be
enacted with as few as twenty-six senators.5'
Figure 1 demonstrates that the easiest way to use the conventional
option to enact filibuster reform is to have a Presiding Officer who will
decide in favor of the reform strategy. As shown on the left side of Figure
1, once the Presiding Officer has ruled in favor of the reform strategy
contained in the initial point of order, a simple majority can table any
appeal of that ruling. By tabling the appeal, a majority effectively enacts
the Presiding Officer's favorable ruling as binding precedent.
But Figure 1 also shows that a pro-reform majority is not dependent on
a favorable ruling from the Presiding Officer to reform the filibuster. As
shown on the right side of Figure 1, if the Presiding Officer rules against
Pro's first point of order, and if Con filibusters Pro's appeal of the denial,
then Pro can raise a second point of order (or "secondary appeal") that
debate on the Presiding Officer's ruling is not permitted (or subject to
some specified limit). Again, a second point of order is not subject to
debate, and thus cannot be filibustered.5 2 Accordingly, once the second
point of order is passed, then a vote on the first point of order immediately
occurs (or occurs after a specified time), which itself only requires a
simple majority of those senators present to vote in its favor to pass.
While, in our view, each of the five strategies we discuss is possible,
our primary goal is only to illustrate the power of a majority to change the
Senate rules. In order to refute our thesis that a majority of senators can
reform the filibuster at any time, one would have to prove that none of
these strategies are possible, and that no other strategy employing
parliamentary points of order is possible as well. In providing these five
strategies, we posit four criteria for any reform strategy:
Magnitude: We are agnostic on the desirability of reforming the
filibuster, but we assume that any coalition implementing one of

51. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl.1 (providing that "a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business").
52. SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL. Richard Beth, an expert at the Congressional Research
Service, notes that "any course of action through which this suggestion might be implemented might
be too complex for practical feasibility." RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42929,
PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING CHANGES IN SENATE RULES 13 (2013). As noted in Part H.A.1, the
members of the U.S. House found this approach practical and feasible in 1811.
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these strategies will consider whether the reform would constitute a
major change in the practice of the Senate.
Practicality: Reforms may have unintended, but foreseeable,
consequences once they have been adopted. It is worthwhile to
consider how strategic politicians will react to a reform after it is
enacted. In practice, a "major" reform may be completely
unworkable.
Plausibility: We do not consider it necessary or sufficient for a
successful parliamentary interpretation to be objectively "right" or
"wrong." However, the stronger the logic of the pro-reform
argument, the easier it will be to explain to the media and gain the
approval of the general public.
Simplicity: We take the view that determined majorities can
accomplish major changes, but some strategies are preferable
because they require fewer steps than others, and thus may take less
time with less risk of failure.
The first two criteria capture different dimensions of how the reform will
change the daily practice of the Senate.53 The last two criteria measure (at
least in part) the transaction costs reformers must pay to impose these
changes. We assume these costs are lower for plausible reforms that
require fewer steps to implement.
In discussing each strategy below, we note factors that limit the
strategy's magnitude, practical effect, plausibility, and simplicity of
implementation.
1. Repeal the Traditional Notion that the Senate Is a Continuing Body
Although this may be the most complicated of the strategies, it has also
been the most attempted.54 First, a majority must overturn a precedent that
the Senate is a "standing body"-that the Senate rules automatically

53. The effect of a reform on policy choices also depends on factors exogenous to the strategy
selected, such as the party, preferences, and agendas of other key actors. In particular, the effect of
reform on executive and judicial nominations will tend to be more significant when the Senate
majority party is the same party as the President and more significant on legislative proposals when the
Senate, House of Representatives, and Presidency are controlled by the same party.
54. See Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217-40 (discussing examples); JULIAN E. ZELIZER, ON
CAPITOL HILL: THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM CONGRESS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1948 2000 (2004)

(same); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the "Continuing Body" Theory of the Senate, 95
IOWA L. REV. 1401 (2010).
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continue from Congress to Congress.55 Next, the Senate, like the House,
would consider amendments to its rules by simple majority vote. While a
minority might still try to obstruct, this strategy gives pro-reform senators
significant advantages by removing the old Senate rules as a fallback.
This was the primary strategy of cloture reformers from 1953 to 1975.
In 1963, 1967, 1969, 1971, and 1975, senators voted (directly or
indirectly) on whether the Senate is a standing body.56 It was not until
1975 that a majority of the Senate was willing to take the first step in this
reform strategy. In 1975, a 51-42 majority initially supported repeal of the
Senate's standing body precedent, but Senate reformers negotiated a
modification in the cloture rule rather than force a simple majority vote on
Senate rules.5 While senators failed to fully execute their strategy, it
nonetheless led to cloture reform and could have provided an open debate
on the Senate's rules.
Two advantages of this approach are that (1) it is based on a plausible
argument and that, (2) if fully implemented, it can lead to any type of
reform in the form of new, formal rule changes. In fact, once the Senate
has conmitted to the notion that it must debate and re-adopt its rules every
two years, there will be a regular opportunity for a simple majority to
adopt future rule changes.
The main disadvantage of this approach-and a major reason senators
have never embraced it-is that it is extremely difficult to implement. The
initial precedent repealing the Senate's standing body status is merely the
first step in a long debate over the rules of the Senate. While senators who
vote to repudiate the "standing body" tradition may do so to achieve
filibuster reform, they also open the door to any and all proposals to revise
Senate rules. Other senators may demand votes on proposals to change the
Senate's committee system, the ethics code, the agenda-setting system, and
so on.

58

Furthermore, this potentially long and complex debate over the rules of
the Senate would occur without any formal rules in place to regulate the

55. In 1959, senators amended Rule V to state, "The rules of the Senate shall continue from one
Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules." Gold & Gupta,
supra note 11, at 240. This action changed nothing. The Senate can always decide that its rules

(including Rule V) do not continue from Congress to Congress, in which case this provision would
cease to be a constraint.
56.

See Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217-40.

57. SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 181 82 (1997).
58. Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) threatened this response in 1957. See ROBERT A. CARO,
MASTER OF THE SENATE: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 857 (2002).
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debate. Instead, the Senate would operate under "general parliamentary
law, 59 which is as vague as it sounds. Senators could appeal to the
Constitution, Thomas Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, the
rules of the House of Representatives and state and foreign legislatures,
and Robert's Rules of Order as authorities on general practice. 60 As
occurred in 1975, this would create ample opportunities for points of order
and votes on parliamentary disputes.
The prospect of this enormous debate, unguided by any set of rules,
with high uncertainty about the outcomes, makes this option both costly
and risky for senators who might otherwise support filibuster reform. In
particular, it is not clear (1) whether any filibuster reform will emerge
from the process, (2) what other reforms might be adopted, and (3) what
reforms will be adopted in subsequent rule debates at the start of each
Congress now that these debates are mandatory. Consequently, this
strategy makes it especially difficult for pro-reform senators to build a
simple majority coalition for their effort.6'
2. Introduce a Previous Question Motion
Since 1811, the House of Representatives has used its "previous
question" motion to limit debate-or to attempt to do so. As discussed in
Part II.A, the meaning of the term "previous question" has evolved greatly
since 1789, but in the modern U.S. House this motion, if approved, has the
effect of terminating debate. Some scholars attribute the persistence of
obstruction in the Senate to the fact that the formal rules of the Senate do
not explicitly provide for a previous question motion. 62 As we argue in
Part II, this view drastically overstates the importance and effectiveness of
the previous question motion. 6' Nonetheless, if a simple majority of the
Senate wants to introduce a previous question motion to the Senate, it
would be simple to do so.
This strategy starts with the recognition that while the rules of the
Senate may not expressly provide for a previous question motion, they

59. See FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 54.

60. Id.
61. See Alexander Bolton, Dems short on votes for filibuster reform, THE HILL (Nov. 13, 2012,
10:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/267471-dems-short-on-votes-for-filibuster-reform
(noting that many Democratic supporters of filibuster reform are otherwise nervous about
constitutional option).
62. SARAH A. BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS (1997).

63. See infra Part II.A (discussing the House previous question motion and its effect on
filibustering in the House).
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also do not expressly forbid the use of a previous question motion. Surely,
a reformer might argue, senators should be free to use a motion that is
generally used in American parliamentary practice if it will make the
Senate a more effective legislature. Thus, any senator may move the
previous question on any bill, nomination, or motion on the Senate floor.
This would doubtless set in motion a cycle of parliamentary objection, a
ruling from the Presiding Officer, and angling for a decisive vote.
A crucial distinction between this strategy and the "continuing body"
approach, however, is that a winning vote on a parliamentary ruling is also
substantively decisive. Once the reform coalition wins the vote on the
appeal from the chair, senators will be able to move the previous question.
Thus, this is a high-impact reform that is simple to implement. And,
importantly, reformers can take this action at any point within a two-year
Congress, and not just at the very beginning.
In the past, senators have considered this strategy plausible enough to
attempt it. In February 1915, Ollie James (D-KY) suggested during Senate
debate that any member could move the previous question on the bill. 4
Once the chair ruled this motion out of order, any member could appeal
the ruling and bring about a simple majority vote on adding a previous
question motion to Senate procedure. James promised to force a vote on
his ruling if he was the Presiding Officer.6 5 Democrats seriously
considered the strategy but did not have the majority needed to win the
procedural question.6 6
The main drawback of this strategy is that the previous question motion
may not be a practical response to filibustering. As we discuss in the next
section, the House of Representatives struggled to use the previous
question motion as a constraint on excessive debate without limiting all
fair debate and amending activity on the chamber floor.6 Furthermore, the
previous question motion was vulnerable to obstruction by dilatory
motions and disappearing quorums, limiting its effectiveness as a cloture
mechanism.6 8

64.
65.

52 CoNG. REC. 3738 (1915) (statement of Sen. James).
Id.

66.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, FLIBUSTERING IN THE SENATE 112

67.
68.

See infra Part II.A.2.
BURDETTE, supra note 66, at 112 31; see also BINDER, supra note 62, at 92 129.

13 (1940).
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3. Transform the Motion to Suspend the Rules
Senate Rule V allows motions to suspend the rules-that is, to ignore
any rule or practice-provided that senators file the motion one day before
they bring it up in the Senate. 69 These motions can include all the detail of
an agenda-setting "special rule" in the House-calling up a bill, laying out
the terms of debate and amendment, and then a specific time for a final
passage vote. In that sense, they are very flexible tools for preventing
obstruction. Unlike the comparable House rule, Senate Rule V does not
specify a threshold for suspending the rules, so the default interpretation
would normally be that a simple majority is required.
However, in 1915 and 1916, the Senate enacted precedents that a twothirds majority is required to suspend the rules. 2 These precedents
demonstrate the ability of a simple majority of the Senate to alter the
practical meaning of standing rules by using the conventional option. The
imposition of a two-thirds threshold was contrary to the previous, if rare,
standard for this motion in the Senate and the general norm of
parliamentary construction: unless specified otherwise, all decisions are
based on simple majority rule.7 ' The best parliamentary justification that
senators could muster for the two-thirds threshold was that the House of
Representatives requires a two-thirds majority to suspend its rules, but this
is only because the rules of the House have specified this threshold since
1822.74
Two new precedents would be required to convert the motion to
suspend the rules into a flexible source of majority power in the Senate.
First, a new precedent is required to ensure that a motion to suspend the

69.

SENATE RULE V, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS,

AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 5

(2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome
("No
motion to suspend, modify, or amend any rule, or any part thereof, shall be in order, except on one
day's notice in writing, specifying precisely the rule or part proposed to be suspended, modified, or
amended, and the purpose thereof.").
70. See RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93-854 GOV, THE MOTION TO PROCEED TO
CONSIDER A MEASURE IN THE SENATE, 1979 1992 (1993).
71. RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, at 1415 ("The Senate can control almost anything by a
majority vote unless a limitation is found in the rules.").
72. Gregory Koger, Filibuster Reform in the Senate, 1913 17, in 2 PARTY, PROCESS, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: FURTHER NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS 205
(David W. Brady & Matthew D. McCubbins eds., 2007); see also RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47,
at 1271 72.
73. See AMAR, supra note 15, at 363 69 (citing a number of sources demonstrating that majority
rule is the default rule); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46
DUKE L.J. 73 (1996) (same).
74. Koger, supra note 72, at 214; see also BINDER, supra note 62, at 89 92.
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rules is nondebatable. ' In Senate parlance, a motion or question that is
"debatable" is subject to a filibuster, so the ability to "debate" motions to
suspend the rules limits their use to prevent filibustering. The rationale for
such a precedent is simple. If this motion is debatable or otherwise
vulnerable to filibustering, its function is nullified because the purpose of
suspending the rules is to circumvent any rule or practice that thwarts the
intent of a majority (or supermajority) of the chamber. To fulfill its
purpose, the motion to suspend the rules should be nondebatable. By itself,
this precedent would provide the Senate with a new procedural tool
against filibusters by single senators or very small coalitions. Instead of
using the standard cloture process, which takes time to attempt and allows
obstructionists to demand and use hours of post-cloture floor time, a large
coalition of senators could suspend the rules by a two-thirds vote to
quickly end a filibuster by a small coalition.
If the majority of the Senate wishes to proceed further and institute
simple majority rule in the Senate, then this is even easier to achieve. After
a motion to suspend the rules receives the support of a majority of the
Senate, but less than a two-thirds supermajority, the Presiding Officer will
declare the motion failed in accordance with the 1915 and 1916 precedents
mentioned above. At that moment, any senator can raise a point of order
that a simple majority is sufficient to suspend the rules and, backed by a
majority, overturn the precedents.
This reform scores very well on our criteria. First, it has a high impact
because motions to suspend the rules can be used to completely inoculate
proposals against obstruction and ensure timely consideration of
legislation supported by a Senate majority.
Second, it is practical. Like special rules in the House, the content of
the motions can be adapted to a wide range of situations as long as the
motion is filed a day ahead of time. But unlike special rules in the House,
the motions would, in practice, probably come directly from the leader of
the majority party rather than a standing conunittee. 6
Third, it is perfectly plausible. This strategy restores the most logical
interpretation of Rule V. It is nonsensical that a motion to suspend the
rules can be filibustered, and the current two-thirds supermajority to

75. RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, at 785 (noting that a motion to suspend the rules is
debatable).
76. Any senator can draft and introduce a motion to suspend the rules, but the majority leader
enjoys priority in recognition, so the Presiding Officer will always call on him or her first.
Consequently, no other senator could call up a motion to suspend the rules without at least the tacit
consent of the majority party leader. See RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, at 1093.
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suspend the rules was concocted out of thin air in defiance of the ordinary
interpretation of Rule V.77 Last but not least, the strategy is simple to
implement. It requires two decisive precedents that can be adopted
separately.8
4. Convert Rule XXII Into a Simple Majority Motion
This option is audacious but effective, as demonstrated by the Senate
Democrats' use of this tactic in November 2013. As prescribed by Senate
Rule XXII, a pro-reform coalition files a cloture petition on a measure and
the Senate votes at noon after a two-day wait. If the number of votes for
cloture is over fifty but under sixty, when the Presiding Officer states that
the cloture attempt has failed, a reformer then raises a point of order that a
simple majority is required to invoke cloture. This objection may be
specific to a particular class of legislation, such as appropriations bills or
executive nominations, or it may be generally applied. In November 2013,
for example, Reid's objection stated that the appropriate threshold for
cloture on all nominations except the Supreme Court should be simple
majority. Reid also retained the sixty-vote threshold for legislation and
Supreme Court nominations.
The benefit of this approach is that it quickly institutes simple majority
cloture in the Senate without the nearly impossible task of building a

77. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 91 (New York, Clark &
Maynard 1871) ("The voice of the majority decides. For the lex majoris partis is the law of all
councils, elections, &c., where not otherwise expressly provided.").
78. Arguably there is constitutional support for this strategy. Akhil Amar argues that the
Constitution implicitly establishes majority rule as a default. AMAR, supra note 15, at 363 69.
Although not specified in the text of the Constitution, the fact that the Constitution only specifies nonmajority rule voting rules arguably supports an inference that a majority rule is the default rule. Id. at
363; see, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that, after a veto, "[i]f after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the
Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two
thirds of that House, it shall become a Law"). In fact, the Court has noted that "the general rule of all
parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of
the body." United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892). Thus, although reinterpreting the motion to
suspend the rules into a majoritarian motion rule would leave the existing cloture rules in place, it
would at least provide a majoritarian means of avoiding a Senate filibuster, which would be consistent
with the default of majority rule. Cf. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of
Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Rules, 47 DuKE L.J. 327 (1997) (arguing that supermajority rules are constitutional as
long as there is a majoritarian right to suspend supermajority requirements at any time). Although we
acknowledge this argument, we do not address its validity. In our view, such constitutional arguments
are not necessary because the conventional option is sufficient to allow a majority of senators to
implement this strategy.
79. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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supermajority coalition to pass a formal rules change. On the other hand,
this reform leaves in place-at least for the time being-the delays built
into the cloture process, such as waiting periods between filing and voting
and an entitlement to post-cloture debate. These delays will still provide
individual senators with great power to slow the progress of individual
measures, or to delay the overall Senate agenda by forcing the chamber to
go through the slow cloture process on any measure blocked by a single
senator.
Another benefit of this strategy is that there is a convenient path to a
decisive vote. Once debate begins on the reformers' initial point of order, a
reformer can raise a second point of order invoking the terms of Rule
XXII: "Points of order, including questions of relevancy, and appeals from
the decision of the Presiding Officer, shall be decided without debate."'
As a secondary point of order and (in the reformers' view) a point of order
arising post-cloture, an immediate vote is guaranteed.
On the other hand, the downside of this strategy is that it is an
especially bold reinterpretation of the existing rule. While many words and
phrases are subject to multiple meanings, Rule XXII's phrase "three-fifths
of the Senators duly chosen and sworn" is unambiguous and hard to
reconcile with a simple majority threshold.8 ' We include this proposal,
however, to highlight that this sort of action is possible. The
reinterpretation is problematic not because it is "incorrect," but because
the reforming coalition would have to2 forthrightly acknowledge and
defend an especially obvious power play.
5. Expand the Right to the Yeas and Nays
Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution states that "the Yeas and Nays
of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one
fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal." 3 As currently interpreted
by Senate practice, this constitutional right to a roll call vote is interpreted

80. SENATE RULE XXII, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS,
AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112- 1, at

21 (2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome.
81. We note the possibility that reformers using this strategy may limit it to specific
circumstances, leaving the general three-fifths requirement in place.
82. One could also argue that Rule XXII is unconstitutional because it violates an implicit
constitutional default of majority rule. See AMAR, supra note 15, at 362 (making this argument); see
also supra text accompanying note 78 (discussing this implicit constitutional rule). However, and as
we noted earlier, given the availability of the conventional option to implement other strategies that
would functionally accomplish the same thing, we do not address this argument in any detail.
83.

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
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as conditional upon a vote actually occurring. Senators may request-and
typically receive-a roll call vote on a bill or amendment, but if this
request is granted debate continues unabated. 4 These requests are
understood as being about the form of a vote: if a vote on a proposition
occurs, an order for the yeas and nays guarantees a roll call vote rather
than a voice vote5 or a standing vote, but does not guarantee that this vote
actually occurs.1
While the current practice is understandable, an advocate for reform
could argue that it subverts the clear meaning of this passage. If one-fifth
of all the senators in the chamber ask for a vote on a pending amendment
or measure, one could argue that they have a constitutional right to that
vote actually occurring, 6 while the current practice of the Senate denies
senators their8 constitutional right to have their "Yeas and Nays" recorded
in the journal. 1
This strategy is straightforward. A senator first brings up a measure or
amendment, asks for the yeas and nays on that proposal, and then (perhaps
after waiting a respectable time for debate to occur, or requesting a time
for a vote by unanimous consent) makes a point of order that the
constitutional guarantee of a vote has been nullified, with an immediate
vote as the only remedy.
This strategy has the rhetorical advantage of being based on a plausible
constitutional argument and being relatively simple to implement.
Substantively, it promises a major change in how the Senate functions
because a minority of senators would suddenly be able to circumvent
obstruction and obtain a vote on their proposals.8 8
However, this reform may be impractical to use on a day-to-day basis.
Unless the Senate wants to eliminate all debate between a call for the yeas
and nays and the actual occurrence of the vote, it may be difficult to devise
a non-arbitrary threshold for deciding how long discussion can continue

84. RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, at 774 ("The ordering of the yeas and nays on a question
does not preclude or shut off further debate thereon before the vote is taken.").
85.

WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-227, VOTING IN THE SENATE: FoRMS AND

REQUIREMENTS (2008). A voice vote occurs when the Presiding Officer says, "all in favor say 'aye,"'
then "all in favor say 'nay,"' then the chair declares the winner based on which side seems to have the
most members. A standing vote is the same, but senators stand to register their preferences when their
position is called. Id. at 1.
86. The call for a yea and nay vote must be supported by one-fifth of those present, assuming a
quorum is present. A majority of the Senate is required for a quorum, so a motion for a roll call vote
may be supported by as few as ten senators. See RIDDICK & FRUMN, supra note 47, at 1416.
87.

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 3.

88. This would put a premium on the Senate Majority Leader to pre- screen bills and amendments
coming to the Senate floor and only call up measures that he or she would like to see come to a formal
vote.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:867

before it begins to violate the constitutional right to a roll call vote.
Furthermore, senators who oppose the reform may subsequently spend a
lot of time devising new ways to force the Senate to take roll call votes. In
practice, this approach would probably prove unworkable by itself but it
would give a pro-reform Senate majority a tremendous bargaining chip it
could use to negotiate for formal rule changes restricting obstruction.
C. Comparison of Conventional Strategies
This list of five strategies to reform the filibuster is not intended to be
exhaustive. We have focused on reforms that are likely to significantly
change the practice of filibustering. Thus, this list of strategies excludes
other possible major reforms and omits a whole range of incremental
reforms that could be imposed by precedent.
Instead, the list is intended to demonstrate that there are a variety of
options that are reasonably plausible. More subtly, the list demonstrates
that we can compare and contrast strategies to select the approach that is
easiest to implement and the most likely to have its desired effect.
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF REFORM OPTIONS
Magnitude of
Change

Practical Effect?

Plausibility of
Objection

Simplicity of
implementation

Repeal Standing Body
Tradition
(high uncertainty)

Move the Previous
Question

Transform Motion to
Suspend the Rules
Rule XXII Cloture by
Simple Majority
Yeas& Nays

Table 1 summarizes this discussion of the reforms based on the review
of each proposal in Part I.B. It is not surprising that almost every strategy
is intended to have a major effect, but the reforms vary across other
dimensions. Based on our comparison, the option that has been tried the
most often-renouncing the Senate's tradition of acting as a continuous
body-is the least effective and most costly strategy. On the other hand,
we rate the strategy of revising the Senate's motion to suspend the rules as
the most effective and least costly.
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The critical point, however, is that each of these reforms is a viable
option and that a simple majority of the Senate can pursue a precedentbased strategy while working within the normal Senate procedures for rule
interpretation.
One may argue, however, that the criteria we posit are insufficient for
assessing reform because they do not consider the appropriateness of
using the conventional option we illustrate here. For example, some
consider it "rude" to reform the filibuster "with 51 votes. ' 9 Moreover, a
group of constitutional law scholars recently sent a letter to the Senate
Judiciary Committee arguing in favor of the "constitutional option" to
reform the filibuster on the first day of the new Congress.90 In the letter the
professors note that "[t]he standing two-thirds requirement for altering the
Senate's rules" in the middle of a Congressional session "is a sensible
effort at preventing changes to the rules in the midst of a game. '
Our concern is with the analogy of Senate politics to a "game" in
which fair play-including rigid adherence to status quo rules-trumps
any sense of purpose. The Constitution established the Senate to "promote
the general Welfare" of the people, even it if means hurting the feelings of
obstructionist senators. 92 The rules of the Senate exist to steer the chamber
toward decisions that fit this mandate; to the extent that the status quo
rules detract from the public welfare, senators have a responsibility to alter
their decision-making process. Moreover, filibustering itself is "rude." In
its various forms, filibustering is the exploitation of rights of deliberation
to deny the majority of a legislature the right to make decisions on public
policy issues.
Most importantly, any argument against the appropriateness of the
conventional option has to take into account the history of the option. If
the conventional option has been used frequently in the past to limit
filibustering, then it would be extraordinarily difficult to argue that the use
of the conventional option now is an unacceptable break with tradition. As
it turns out, the conventional option we describe has been used repeatedly

89. See Klein, supra note 12. In his post, Klein includes a link to support his claim that the
Senate can change the rules "with 51 votes." Id. Klein's link is to a blog post with a lengthy discussion
of how to change the Senate rules with fifty-one votes written by one of the authors. Id. (citing
Jonathan Bernstein, A Very Wonky Post About Senate Rules, A PLAIN BLOG ABOUT POLITICS (Dec.
15, 2010, 2:17 PM), http://plainblogaboutpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/very-wonky-post-aboutsenate-rules.html).
90. See Letter by Bruce Ackerman, supra note 12.
91. Id.at1.
92. See U.S. CONST., pmbl.
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by both the House and the Senate to curb filibustering. We now discuss
that history in the next Part.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FILIBUSTER REFORM IN CONGRESS
The previous Part demonstrated that simple majorities of the Senate
can achieve major reforms by using the conventional option. This Part
explains how the conventional option has been critical to the development
of procedural rules on filibustering in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Along the way, we compare and contrast our historical
account of Congressional filibustering with different accounts found in the
political science and legal scholarship. Our perspective reflects recent
research in political science 93 that, as we discuss in more detail, corrects
classic claims about filibustering and the Senate.
This Part shows that filibustering is not an idiosyncrasy of the Senate.
Filibustering, in fact, was once common in the House of Representatives.
During the first century of Congressional history, there were roughly twice
as many filibusters in the House as the Senate.94 We further show that the
House achieved its current majoritarian structure by using the
conventional option we describe in this Article. Accordingly, we argue
that much can be learned about how legislators can restrict filibustering by
closely examining how the members of the House reduced obstruction in
their chamber.
This Part also shows that filibustering has not always been pervasive in
the Senate. The Senate, like the House, has limited filibustering in the past
by using the conventional option. As we discuss below, the Senate has
limited the filibuster before, and can do so again if a majority of senators
so choose.

93.

E.g., FILIBUSThRING, supra note 5; GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER:

OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE (2006); KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A
THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING (1998); BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57; Gregory J. Wawro & Eric
Schickler, Legislative Obstructionism, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 297 (2010); Gregory Koger,
Filibustering and Majority Rule in the Senate: The Contest over Judicial Nominations, 2003 2005, in
WHY NOT PARTIES?: PARTY EFFECTS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 159 (Nathan W. Monroe et al.

eds., 2008); Bruce L. Oppenheimer, Changing Time Constraints on Congress: Historical Perspectives
on the Use of Cloture, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 393 (3d ed., Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce L.
Oppenheimer eds., 1985).
94. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 37 96.
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A Reforming the Filibuster in the House
Before we discuss the history of filibuster reform in the House, we
begin by debunking a common myth about why filibustering in the Senate
persists while it does not in the House. Several previous analyses of
filibustering begin with the premise that filibustering in the Senate persists
because a procedural motion known as the "previous question" was
deleted from the rules of the Senate in 1806.
In its simplest form, the argument is that:
1. The previous question is intrinsically a simple majority motion
to cut off debate;
2. The rules of the House allow members to move the previous
question;
3. The rules of the Senate do not include a previous question
motion, and have not since the motion was deleted from the rules
in 1806;
Ergo, the House is a majority rule chamber while the Senate is not.
This premise, and the argument that flows from it, are both widely
accepted in the existing literature. For example, Emmet J. Bondurant
begins an essay on filibuster reform with this claim:
Filibusters in the Senate are a profoundly undemocratic result of a
mistake made in 1806 when the Senate accepted the advice of
Aaron Burr and eliminated the "previous question" motion from its
rules. Before that change, the previous question motion had been a
"non-debatable motion that, if favored by the majority, close[d]
95
debate and force[d] an immediate vote on a matter.,
Consequently, Bondurant concludes that "filibusters as a parliamentary
96
tactic were unknown at the time the Constitution was adopted."
For support, Bondurant quotes Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky,
who offer a more nuanced discussion of the topic.9 According to Fisk and

95. Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 467, 468 (2011) (footnote omitted).
96. Id. As noted earlier, the claim that filibusters were "unknown" to the authors of the
Constitution or the early members of the Senate is incorrect. There were filibusters in the Continental
Congress and state legislatures prior to the drafting of the Constitution. See supra text accompanying
notes 22 23.
97. Bondurant, supra note 95, at 468 n.3 (citing Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REv. 181, 188 (1997)).
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Chemerinsky, "[i]t is unclear whether the previous question, in the form
then practiced, served as a device to bring a measure to a vote, or whether
it served to defer discussion of sensitive or embarrassing questions." 8
Indeed, the version of the previous question motion adopted by the House
in the First Congress stated that "[o]n a previous question no member shall
speak more than once without leave." 99 Admittedly, this is a bit more
restrictive than the general two-speech rule that applied to other
questions.'00 However, the text of the rule makes clear that, far from
cutting off all debate and bringing a bill to an immediate vote, a previous
question motion initiated a new (albeit limited) debate about whether to
continue discussing the topic on the floor. And, if the previous question
motion was approved, then debate on the main subject would continue
unabated.
This latter view-that the previous question motion of the First
Congress initiated debate, not stopped it-is more consistent with the
historical record. Robert Luce notes that in the early years of Congress, if
a chamber voted against a previous question motion, then "it meant the
main question was suppressed for the day."' 0 ' This claim is confirmed in a
monograph by Joseph Cooper, later printed as a Senate document, which
explored the early use of the previous question motion in the Senate to
determine if approving the motion had the effect of ending debate.0 2
Moreover, Vice President Aaron Burr's rationale for eliminating the
previous question motion in the Senate was that it was redundant with the
motion for indefinite postponement. 0 3 This rationale is further evidence
that the previous question motion was used to put off delicate matters, not
to end obstruction by prolonged speechmaking.
1. Transforming the Previous Question Motion, February 1811
If the initial rules of the House did not include a motion to limit debate,
how did the House arrive at its current limits on debate? A first step along

98. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 97, at 188 (footnote omitted).
99. H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1789).
100. Id.
101. ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES AND THE COURSE OF
BUSINESS IN THE FRAMING OF STATUTES 270 (1922); see also DE ALVA STANWOOD ALEXANDER,
HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 180 81 (1916).
102. JOSEPH COOPER, THE PREVIOUS QUESTION: ITS STANDING AS A PRECEDENT FOR CLOTURE IN
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 87-104 (1962).
103. 1 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS
DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 365 (Charles Francis Adams ed. 1874).
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this path was the transformation of the previous question motion during
the tense period preceding the War of 1812.
In the early morning hours of February 28, 1811, House members
voted to change the interpretation of the previous question from a means
of shelving delicate issues into a tool for cutting off debate. 0 4 During a
debate on American-English trade, a frustrated Republican majority
moved and approved the previous question. 10 5 Immediately afterwards,
Thomas Gholson (R-VA), a member of the Republican majority, made a
point of order that debate was not allowed after the previous question had
been approved. 10 6 When Barent Gardenier (Fed-NY), a particularly
loquacious obstructionist, rose to speak on the point of order, another
member, Peter Porter (R-NY), made a second point of order that debate is
not allowed on challenges to the chair's rulings.'10 All eight Federalists
voted to allow debate on challenges, but Republicans voted 66-5 to
prohibit it.'0 8 Once debate on rulings from the chair had been stifled, the
House swiftly approved Gholson' s point of order, which prohibited debate
after the previous question motion had been approved.' 0 9 In two quick
steps, the previous question motion was transformed from a means for
continuing debate to a tool for ending it." 0
There are two important lessons in this episode. The first lesson is that
the method used by the House majority above illustrates the general point
of Part I: when a majority is faced by an obstructionist minority, using the
conventional option of reinterpreting rules and setting new precedents can
be more efficient and effective than attempting to formally change the
rules. Specifically, this episode illustrates the right-side path in Figure 1,
which shows a majority overturning an unfavorable decision by the chair
by invoking a secondary point of order limiting debate on the first point of
order. "'
The second lesson is that legislative majorities have extremely wide
latitude when interpreting the rules of their own chamber. In 1811, the
House converted the previous question-which previously had the effect

104. Most contemporary and subsequent accounts of the previous question consider the night of
February 27 28, 1811, the decisive act that transformed the previous question motion. See 22 ANNALS
OF CONG. 1091 93 (1811); ALEXANDER, supra note 101, at 185 88; 5 ASHERC. HINDS, PRECEDENTS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 5445 (1907).
105. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 1091 93.
106. Id. at 1091 92.
107. Id. at 1091 94.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See supra Figure 1, at page 11.
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of continuing the conversation if affirmed-into a motion to do the exact
opposite. For senators seeking to emulate the House's actions on this late
night in 1811, the lesson is not that the Senate reformers need a previous
question motion. Instead, senators need any existing Senate rule or
constitutional provision that can be converted into a means for limiting
debate, and the conventional option gives them wide latitude to redefine
the meaning of that rule.
2. Filibustering in the House, 1811-1889
Despite the reforms made on February 28, 1811, subsequent House
majorities struggled to use the previous question motion to end debate.
Initial rulings by Speaker Henry Clay held that approving the previous
question motion led to a direct vote on the underlying bill. 112 Amendments
which had been approved in the Conunittee of the Whole or which were
still pending when the previous question was called were dropped. This
clumsiness, combined with general norms against suppressing
deliberation, led to infrequent use of the motion in the years following the
War of 1812."'
Figure 2 illustrates the number of roll call votes on previous question
motions from 1789 to 1889.114 Once House members began to use the
motion more frequently after 1830, they made several changes to the
previous question rule to make it more useful. The House adopted rules
changes in 1840, 1848, 1860, 1880, and 1890 that improved the
application of the previous question.! 15 In its 1890 form, the rule allowed a
member to apply the previous question motion to a single motion, a series
of motions, an amendment or amendments, or to carry a bill through to
final passage. 1 6 The numerous reforms to the previous question rule
illustrate how an institutional change like the 1811 transformation may
require subsequent reforms to be effective. These subsequent revisions add
to the transaction costs for the initial reform.

112. HINDS, supra note 104, § 5446.
113. BINDER, supra note 62, at 89.
114. The information in Figure 2 is based on data contained in Inter-University Consortium for
Pol. & Soc. Research & Cong. Quarterly, United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records,
1789 1996 (1998).
115. ALEXANDER, supra note 101, at 189 206.
116. Id.at277 79.
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Despite the use and improvement of the previous question motion,
obstruction was common in the House throughout the nineteenth century.
Why? The previous question motion was only effective as a limit on
normal deliberation, such as speaking and offering amendments to a bill.
But members of both the House and Senate used other filibustering tactics
that were immune to the previous question motion. First, they could make
and repeat motions that had priority over a vote on the previous question,
such as a motion to adjourn, take a recess, or fix the day to which the
House shall adjourn. 1 7 For example, if one member moved the previous
question and another member subsequently moved to adjourn, the first
vote would be on the motion to adjourn. These dilatory motions could be
alternated until either the minority or majority faction grew tired.

117. FILIBUSThRING, supra note 5, at 17.
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Second, previous question motions were also ineffective against a
minority obstructing by refusing to vote en masse, a tactic called the
"disappearing quorum." Again, this tactic entailed members of a
legislature refusing to participate in a vote so that the participation rate
falls below the threshold for a quorum. In 2003 (Texas) and 2011
(Wisconsin and Indiana), state legislators fled across state lines to avoid
being forcibly returned to their legislatures to contribute to a quorum. 118 In
the House and Senate, there was a norm, despite rules to the contrary, that
members were not compelled to vote, and if they did not vote they did not
count toward a quorum. If some legislators were absent for innocuous
reasons like illness or travel, a minority of the legislature could "break" a
quorum by refusing to vote and thereby "disappearing."" 9
Incorporating these tactics into our definition of "filibustering"
produces a surprising pattern. There was more obstruction in the
nineteenth century House of Representatives than in the Senate. Figure 3
depicts a summary of this pattern, showing during the nineteenth century
both the general increase in obstruction over
time in both chambers and
20
the higher level of obstruction in the House.

118.

Karl

LEGISLATORS:

Kurtz,
THE

Disappearing
THICKET

AT

and
STATE

Bolting

Forums,

LEGISLATURES

THE NAT'L COUNCIL
BLOG

(Feb.

21,

2012,

ON
3:33

STATE
PM),

http://ncsl.typepad.con/the thicket/2012/02/disappearing -and-bolting-quorums.html.
119. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 18.
120. Based on data collected, Koger identifies attempted disappearing quorums by scanning roll
call records for votes on which most members of one party voted, most members of the opposing party
did not vote, and the difference between the two proportions was statistically significant. A "dilatory
motion" is one of a set of procedural motions that failed a roll call vote. A filibuster is defined as a bill
or nomination opposed by a threshold level of obstruction. See id. at 42 53.
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Obstruction by non-voting was impervious to a previous question
motion because, in the absence of a quorum, the House could not make
any legislative decisions, including calling the previous question. As
filibustering reached crisis levels between 1881 and 1889, there were
fourteen successful disappearing quorums against previous question
motions. 12 During a subsequent showdown over House obstruction from
1890 to 1894, there were forty-three more successful efforts to break a
122
quorum.
Critically, the general ability of House and Senate members to
filibuster included the power to obstruct changes to the rules of their
respective chambers. In both chambers, legislators faced a situation similar
to the modern Senate: any rules change, including proposed restrictions on
filibustering, was itself subject to obstruction. In practice, as it turns out,
this was a greater obstacle for rules changes in the nineteenth century
House than the Senate. There were more filibusters against proposed rules

121.
122.

These statistics are based on an analysis of the data used to create Figure 3.
Id.
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changes in the House than the Senate, including two rules changes that
were blocked by obstruction in 1882 and 1889.123 In the latter case, the
obstructionists actually blocked a previous question motion
successfully. 124 The main proponent of the 1889 rule change, Thomas
Reed (R-ME), learned that he would have to try a different approach
if he
125
wanted to force through controversial changes in the House rules.
3. The Revolution in the House, 1889-1894
At the beginning of the 51st Congress in 1889, the leaders of the
Republican Party faced a challenge that may sound familiar. Filibustering
had reached a crisis level. Both contemporary observers and historians
consider the 50th Congress one of the most ineffective in history because
one chamber of Congress was paralyzed by obstruction. The minority
party considered itself entitled to veto the policy agenda of the party which
had gained united control of Congress and the White House in the
previous election. And any attempt to correct this dysfunction by
amending the rules of the House was itself subject to obstruction and a
minority party veto.
When the 51st Congress began, the Republicans elected Thomas Reed
as Speaker.'12 Reed had been arguing for more centralized and efficient
House rules for several years. Reed waited to act until the House began
debating a contested election on January 29, 1890.128 Democrats refused to
vote on the motion to consider this case, thereby breaking the quorum, but
Reed directed the House Clerk to note that several Democrats were present
but not voting so a quorum was present. After heated debate, this ruling
was sustained 162-0 the next day, with zero Democrats voting. On January

123. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 65 66.
124. Id.
125. See generally WILLIAM A. ROBINSON, THOMAS B. REED: PARLIAMENTARIAN (1930)
(discussing history of 1889 rule change).
126.

RICHARD V. REMINI, THE HOUSE: THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 243

(2006). Since 1889 to 1894 is the pivotal period of House history, the events are recounted in
numerous sources. For recent works, see BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57; FILIBUSTERING, supra note
5; ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001); and for classic works, see LUCE, supra note 101; ORLANDO OSCAR
STEALEY, TWENTY YEARS IN THE PRESS GALLERY (1906).

127. Speakers of the House (1789 to present), U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.
house.gov/People/Office/Speakers/.
128. REMINI, supra note 126, at 248. At this point the House had not yet adopted any rules to
govern the 51st Congress, so the House was using "general parliamentary law." Since this term had
little precise meaning, this tactic provided Reed with extra leeway in his parliamentary rulings.
However, this was not necessary for Reed's actions. Reed felt his rulings were entirely Constitutional,
so his rulings would have been valid in either case. See id. at 250.
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31, a second ruling (163-0, zero Democrats voting) affirmed the Speaker's
right to ignore dilatory motions. 1 29 Accordingly, in a span of only three
days the Republicans had used the conventional option to suppress the two
primary forms of filibustering in the Nineteenth Century House.
Ten days after the second ruling, the House began debate on a new
code of House rules, including rules codifying Speaker Reed's decisions.
Having been deprived of their obstructionist techniques, the minority
Democrats did not compel the Republicans to use the previous question to
end debate on the Reed Rules. Instead, the majority and minority
negotiated an agreement for consideration of the rules. 30 The Republicans
agreed to a resolution for considering the rules dictated by the Democrats.
The resolution passed without any recorded disagreement.' 3 ' This accord
automatically enforced the previous question after three days. But it is
worth emphasizing that the previous question motion was not used to stifle
obstruction against the adoption of chamber rules. Reed's precedents had
already accomplished that feat.
While this is the critical battle for purposes of this Article, we note that
the war over filibustering continued for another four years. The Democrats
regained control of the House in the 1890 elections and repudiated the
anti-obstruction rules in 1891. By 1893, the Democrats had quietly
devised their own response to dilatory motions. By 1894, the Democrats
accepted limits on disappearing quorums after a prolonged Republican
filibuster. The Republican minority lost their veto power but won their
point. The House of Representatives could not3 2govern the republic with a
minority party empowered to veto everything. 1
As with the transformation of the previous question motion in 1811, the
lesson from the House's efforts to suppress obstruction in the 1890s is that
the critical step was a pair of decisive votes on rulings from the Presiding
Officer. These rulings were achieved in much the same way as senators
enforce or revise their rules because the members of the House could not
and did not invoke an already-enforceable cloture rule.
An even more important ingredient was determination. By the 1890s,
the members and leaders of the majority party in the House of
Representatives decided that their institution was at an impasse. They

129. FiLBUSThRTNG, supra note 5, at 54-55.
130. 21 CONG. REC. 1206-08 (1890).
131. Id.
132. For a more extensive discussion of this phase, see SCHICKLER,
FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 55 56.

supra note

126;
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faced a choice between governing and maintaining the traditions of the
chamber, and they chose the former.
B. Reforming the Filibuster in the Senate
As with our discussion of the House, we do not intend to survey the
entire history of filibustering and reform in the Senate in this section.' 33
Instead, we merely seek to point out that senators had the power, through
the conventional option, to adopt strong limits on filibustering throughout
much of Senate history. If they had chosen to do so, their path to reform
was no more difficult-and probably easier-than for their counterparts in
the pre-Reed House.
1. Limits on Senate Filibustering Before 1917
The rules of the first Senate provided for the Presiding Officer to call
senators to order for violating chamber rules and holding votes when the
application of the rules to a case was uncertain. By 1828, the Senate rule
clearly stated that every decision by the Presiding Officer was subject to
an appeal to a vote by the Senate, in effect establishing the conventional
option. 3 4 This power could be used, and was used, to restrict filibustering.
Senators reinterpreted rules to limit filibustering before the adoption of
the first Senate 1cloture
rule in 1917. Three prominent anti-obstruction
5
precedents were: 1
* 1879: the Presiding Officer counts all present senators, even
nonvoting senators, toward a quorum.16
* 1897: the Presiding Officer mandates that a senator cannot

request a quorum call immediately after a vote revealing the
presence of a quorum.117

133. For well-researched accounts, see FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5; WAWRO & SCHICKLER,
supra note 93; ZELIZER, supra note 54; BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57; BURDETTE, supra note 66;
GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE (1938);
CLARA HANNAH KERR, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1895);

Oppenheimer, supra note 93.
134. WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 93, at 65 72. The authors go on to trace the development
of a nondebatable motion to table appeals from rulings of the Presiding Officer.
135. For additional examples, see id. at 70; BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57, at 7.
136. BURDETTE, supra note 66, at 38 39.
137. Id. at 68.
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* 1908: the Presiding Officer counts nonvoting senators toward a
quorum on a roll call vote. Upheld by roll
call votes of thirty138
five to eight and thirty-five to thirteen.
These actions, and similar precedents set over the years, suffice to show
that majorities could restrict obstruction by precedent if they chose to do
so.

But the historic Senate, like the current Senate, permitted filibustering
by endless debate. In fact, some scholars point to a threatened filibuster
against a proposed previous question rule in 1841 and an actual filibuster
against an anti-obstruction rule proposal in 1891 as evidence that it was
difficult to restrict obstruction in the Senate. 139 In these two instances, it
would have been easier to bring these anti-obstruction proposals to a vote
if obstruction was already impossible, although it is not certain in either
case that the propositions had enough votes to succeed. 140 What these two
incidents do not prove, however, is that it was impossible to restrict
obstruction in the Senate, or more difficult to restrict obstruction in the

Senate than the House. After all, these proposals were exposed to
filibustering because their sponsors proposed them as formal rules
changes. The reform advocates in both cases could have circumvented this
quandary by using the conventional option to force votes on antiobstruction points of order instead. Senators also had the option of
bringing up rules changes at the beginning of a new Congress while the
floor agenda was usually uncrowded (1841 being a bit of an exception),
which would make it easy for senators to wait out a filibuster.
There is an alternative explanation for why the Senate did not follow
the more drastic course set by the House in the 1890s. For the most part,
Senate majorities were able to wait out filibusters, so it was rare for
senators to pay the high costs of obstruction with little prospect of
success. 14' Narrow majorities were often able to win in this environment
without strict rules to limit debate and, if necessary, could expedite the
42
passage of controversial bills with new parliamentary precedents.

138. Id. at 86 88.
139. BINDER, supra note 62, at 178 99. But see WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 93, at 72 87.
140. As Wawro and Schickler point out, the coalitions supporting the underlying bills were, in
both cases, internally divided. This is especially clear in the 1891 case, when the election enforcement
bill (labeled the "Force Bill" by its detractors) and the rule proposal were eventually sidelined by
motions to switch to other legislation. WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 93, at 72 87.
141. FILIBUSThRiNG, supra note 5, at 78 95.
142. See generally WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 93 (discussing the procedures the
Nineteenth Century Senate had for expediting passage of bills).
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During this era, a majority cloture rule was a solution without a recurring
problem.
2. Cloture and Reform in the Senate, 1917-1949
The "classic" Senate, in which filibustering was possible but rare and
subject to the patience of the majority, lasted until the early twentieth
century. During the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, Senate Republicans
played the now-familiar role of a minority party obstructing the agenda of
a newly elected Democratic President taking power after a period of
divided government. In some cases, defecting Senate Democrats
welcomed the cover provided by Republican obstruction. Wilson,
however, came to despise the filibuster. The 1916 Democratic Party
platform-drafted by 143
Wilson-included an endorsement of a Senate rule
limiting filibustering.
The Senate's first "cloture" rule would come soon after the 1916
election. After "a little band of willful men," as Wilson called them,
blocked a bill concerning merchant shipping in the final days of the 66th
Congress, Wilson called the chamber back into session to adopt its first
cloture rule.' 44 Senators, however, fearing the concentration of power that
would result from the combination of a majority cloture rule, party
caucuses that could dictate the floor votes of party members, and a
President making aggressive use of patronage and the bully pulpit, only
adopted a rule providing for closure by a two-thirds vote. 145 This rule
essentially codified the status quo, since it took a third of the chamber or
more to sustain a filibuster. 46 Over the next eight years, senators rejected
simple majority cloture on three different occasions.' 47 At the same time,
senators allowed the rule to be undermined by new cloture-proof tactics

143. Koger, supra note 72; see also Kathleen Bawn & Gregory Koger, Effort, Intensity and
Position Taking: Reconsidering Obstruction in the Pre-Cloture Senate, 20 J. THEORETICAL POL. 67
(2008); THOMAS W.

RYLEY, A LITTLE GROUP OF WILLFUL MEN: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL

PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY (1975); Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217 26.
144. Koger, supra note 72, at 220.
145. Gold and Gupta credit the adoption of the 1917 cloture rule to the threat of a "constitutional
option" expressed during floor debate over the closed rule. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217 26.
This is inconsistent with the near-universal account of the 1917 rule, which attributes the timing of this
rule to the firestorm of public opinion excited by Woodrow Wilson. In order for a threatened
constitutional option to lead to bargaining and concessions, the opponents of reform must consider the
threat credible. There is little evidence to suggest that the senators proposing a constitutional option
had the votes to carry through. See Koger, supra note 72, at 209 20.
146. Koger, supra note 72, at 221.
147. Gregory Koger, Cloture Reform & Party Government in the Senate, 1918 25, 68 J. POL. 708
(2006).
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like filibustering during the opening of the Senate and filing hundreds of
amendments to a bill before cloture is invoked.14
During the 1920s, senators did embrace a different kind of reform:
changing the congressional schedule so there is no longer a filibusterprone "short" session that continues until the March following an
election. 149 Senators were more likely to filibuster during short sessions
because their end date was known in advance. This meant that everyone
knew how long the filibuster had to last to succeed, how much other
legislation was pending and, finally, how much potential collateral damage
would be caused by a filibuster. This reform was finally adopted as the
20th Amendment to the Constitution in 1933.5°
3. The Long Debate on Cloture Reform, 1949-1975
In 1949, after a decade of relative stability, senators renewed their
debate over filibustering and reform. This conversation would last for
three decades and culminate in four major revisions of the cloture rule.
The net result of these revisions was a shift in the threshold for cloture
from two-thirds of all voting senators to three-fifths of the entire Senate,
and a rule that was a little more foolproof. In the beginning, the cloture
reform effort was closely tied to the politics of the civil rights movement,
with supporters of civil rights legislation seeking a more restrictive cloture
rule and opponents opposing cloture reform. 151 The reform effort persisted
after the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of
1965, however,
supported by a coalition of left-leaning interest groups and
52
senators. 1
Much of the effort to change the cloture rule could have been avoided
if senators had simply used the conventional option to reinterpret the
cloture rule in 1949. In March 1949, reformers set out to close the
loopholes in the 1917 cloture rule, particularly the interpretation that held
that the rule only applied to bills once they were on the floor of the Senate,
but not to motions to bring those bills to the floor. 153 On March 11, 1949,
the Senate held a vote on this interpretation of the rule, with Vice
President Alben Barkley ruling from the chair that the cloture rule also
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applied to motions. 154 However, senators overturned this ruling by a vote
of forty-six to forty-one. 155 After this defeat the reformers agreed to a
compromise rule, but, since they had lost this critical vote, they had little
leverage. 156 The 1949 rule allowed cloture on any "measure, motion, or
issue" by two-thirds of the entire Senate,
except no cloture was possible on
15
resolutions to change Senate rules.'
The reformers' reliance on the constitutional option, rather than the
conventional option, began in earnest as a response to the 1949 rule, which
seemingly allowed no mechanism for contested rules changes. Efforts in
1953 and 1957 failed, but by 1959 Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (DTX) was nervous enough about the danger of a majoritarian coup that he
proposed a new compromise rule which lowered the cloture threshold to
two-thirds of all senators 1voting
and re-applied the cloture rule to proposed
58
rules.
Senate
to
revisions
Neither the 1959 rule nor the passage of major civil rights legislation
quelled the movement for further cloture reform. Reform efforts came up
for a vote in 1961, 1963, 1967, 1969, and 1971.159 But in each case the
reformers lost test votes or votes on key parliamentary rulings. 160
4. The Modern Senate Filibuster, 1975-Present
In 1975, however, the reformers had a clear opportunity for success.
The Democratic majority's ranks swelled to sixty members, and Vice
President Rockefeller, a Republican, strongly supported cloture reform.161
For the first time, reformers won a test vote on whether the Senate is a
standing body, fifty-one to forty-two. 162 In the ensuing debate, reformers
showed little interest in squelching last-gasp filibustering by James Allen
(D-AL) and, after negotiations with the leaders of both parties, the
reformers settled for the current cloture thresholds: (1) three-fifths of the
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entire Senate to invoke cloture163 on most measures, and (2) two-thirds of
those voting for rules changes.
The 1975 episode illustrates the drawbacks of the constitutional option.
It was extremely difficult to build a majority for the constitutional option
even though, as Sarah Binder and Steve Smith stress, there were multiple
instances between 1959 and 1975 when a simple majority voted to support
reform. 164 Moreover, when the reformers finally won their critical vote in
1975, this victory did not directly impose any real limits on filibustering,
nor lay out a clear path to voting on rules changes.
The 1975 rule ended the biennial efforts to lower the cloture threshold
for the next twenty years, but it also began a period of tightening and
clarifying the rule. In 1976 the rule was amended to clarify the process for
filing amendments before cloture is invoked. 65 In a June 1976 precedent,
the Senate voted that a motion to indefinitely postpone an amendment
after cloture was invoked was dilatory. In early 1977, an attempt by thenMajority Leader Robert Byrd to limit post-cloture filibusters by forcing
votes on dozens of amendments was blocked by the threat of a
filibuster.166 However, in October 1977, Byrd, working with Vice
President Walter Mondale, successfully cracked down on this tactic by
ruling the gratuitous amendments dilatory and out of order. 16 This was a
clear illustration that senators can limit obstruction using the
conventional
68
option without revoking the Senate's standing body status.
More reforms would come under Byrd's leadership. In 1979, the Senate
revised the cloture rule to prevent filibusters-by-amendment after cloture
had been invoked. 169 The Republican majority agreed to this revision in
exchange for Byrd dropping his threat to push through a broader package
of reforms by majority vote. 17 Subsequently, Byrd also streamlined the
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nomination process by combining the motion to switch from legislative to
executive business (treaties and nominations) and to take up a specific
nomination.171 This reform was accomplished by a vote on a parliamentary
ruling in March 1980-not a rule change, and not at the beginning of a
new Congress. In other words, this reform was implemented through the
conventional option, with no lasting adverse consequences.
After three decades of debate over the cloture rule change and six years
of revision and extension, the Senate stabilized from 1981 to the present.
In 1986, senators agreed to reduce post-cloture debate time from 100
hours to thirty hours, but otherwise left the rule intact. 17 2 In 1995, a
proposal by Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), which
lowered the cloture threshold by three votes after each failed cloture vote
until it reached fifty-one senators, failed by a large seventy-six to nineteen
margin, after which there was little mention of cloture reform for several
years. ' From 2003 to 2005, the Senate engaged in a well-known
argument over judicial nominations that ended in May 2005 with a bargain
between a bipartisan group of senators dubbed the "Gang of 14," many of
whom were ideologically moderate. 74 The resulting bargain did not result
in any rule changes but defused the crisis with informal guarantees of fair
behavior. As in previous disputes, the key to this deal was the threat of
manipulation of chamber rules by simple majority vote in the middle of a
session.
Obviously, the debate over filibuster reform continues. In January
2011, frustrated Democratic senators proposed reforms that would revive
attrition-style filibusters by forcing filibustering senators to actually hold
the floor of the Senate.' 75 These proposals failed forty-four to fifty-one and
forty-six to forty-nine, with all votes in favor coming from Democratic
senators; these votes suggested near-universal support within the majority
party.' 7 6 These margins are somewhat deceptive, however, since these
proposals required a two-thirds majority for passage in accordance with an
agreement struck between Democratic and Republican leaders. As part of
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this deal the Senate also enacted standing orders to publicize individual
threats to filibuster, known as holds, and to waive the reading of
amendments. The reforms were limited because the Democrats lacked the
votes to force their reforms through and hence the bargaining leverage to
extort major concessions from the minority party. 177
Democratic frustration clearly increased. On October 6, 2011, Reid led
an effort to prohibit motions to suspend the rules and allow nongermane
amendments after cloture has been invoked. Notably, Reid and a nearunanimous Democratic majority (Democrats fifty-one to one; Republicans
zero to forty-seven) made this reform by overturning both a ruling from
the Presiding Officer and the advice of the Senate Parliamentarian based
on earlier precedents.' 8 While this reform was relatively modest by itself,
the willingness of the Democrats to use this method suggested that they
were frustrated enough to use parliamentary precedents to reshape Senate
process. In May 2012, Reid expressed this frustration, stating, "If there
were anything that ever needed changing in this
body, it's the filibuster
17
rules, because it's been abused, abused, abused.' 1
In January 2013, Reid negotiated a second set of reforms with minority
leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY). This reform package included two rules
changes: (1) it streamlined the steps to initiate a conference committee to
resolve differences with the House on a bill to a single cloture vote and
two hours of debate, and (2) established an expedited process for cloture
petitions on agenda-setting "motions to proceed", provided the cloture
petition is supported by the leaders and at least seven other members of
each party. Additionally, two "trial reforms" were adopted for the duration
of the 113th Congress: (1) shortened post-cloture debate for low-level
executive positions and district court judges, and (2) simple-majority
cloture for motions to proceed provided that each party is allowed to offer
two amendments of its choice. 8 0
The January 2013 agreement included a pledge of good behavior (that
is, no unreasonable obstruction) by the Republicans and a conmlitment
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from Reid that he would not pursue any conventional option maneuvers
during the 113th Congress. Neither promise lasted six months. By midJuly, Reid threatened to impose simple majority cloture on executive
branch nominations in order to push through candidates for Secretary of
Labor, the directors of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and
Environmental Protection Agency, and three slots on the National Labor
Relations Board.' 8 ' In the hours before the Senate held its showdown votes
on a conventional option, Reid struck a deal with some Republican
members to approve the held-up nominations, except that two of the three
NLRB nominees were swapped for other candidates. 82
This uneasy peace lasted until November 2013. The Democrats were
frustrated by Republican obstruction of three nominations to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the nomination
of Representative Melvin Watt (D-NC) to head the Federal Housing
Finance Agency, and once again threatened to reinterpret Rule 22 so a
simple majority is sufficient to limit debate on nominations. Unlike
previous iterations of this game, however, senators did not defuse the
crisis with a last-minute bipartisan deal. On November 21 senators voted
fifty-two to forty-eight (with three Democratic "nay" votes) to
"reinterpret" the three-fifths clause of Senate Rule 22 to mean "simple
majority" for all executive nominations and all district and appellate court
positions. 8 3 Note that Reid's proposed reinterpretation excludes Supreme
Court nominations without any clear basis for this distinction. The
precedent could easily be extended to Supreme Court nominations if the
situation arises. The precedent also retains the three-fifths cloture
threshold for ordinary legislation.
Filibustering persists in the Senate because no majority of the Senate
has ever taken the necessary steps to abolish the practice. The Senate
filibuster will be reformed if and when a majority of the chamber decides
that they lose more than they gain by tolerating the existing practice.
Should that day come, the pro-reform majority will not lack for procedural
strategies to limit filibustering.

181.

Humberto Sanchez, Senate Democrats Set Showdown Over Filibusters of Nominees, CQ

WEEKLY, July 15, 2013, at 1212.
182. Id.

183. This process is summarized above in Part I.B.4. See also Humberto Sanchez, A Landmark
Change to Filibuster, CQ WEEKLY, Dec. 2, 2013, at 1992 93.

2014]

THE CONVENTIONAL OPTION

CONCLUSION

As noted in the Introduction, Senator Reid has recently used the
"nuclear option" to abolish the filibuster for judicial nominees. 184 But by
using such terms as "nuclear option," reformers imply that the chief
obstacle to reform is the set of current Senate rules and procedures. As
shown in this Article, there is nothing stopping a majority of senators from
enacting further reforms during this current Congressional term or at any
point during a subsequent session. In fact, and as evidenced by the
conventional option, the existing Senate rules and procedures demonstrate
that a majority of senators can enact any reform it desires at any timethat the Senate is ultimately a majoritarian institution. Accordingly, the
debate over reform should not "shroud the issue in layer upon layer of
reform
procedural complexity," but focus on the merits of any proposed
85
and the reasons why senators prefer the status quo or reform.
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